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The eighteenth century was a markedly volatile period in 
the history of Russia, seeing its development and international 
emergence as a European-styled empire. In narratives of this time 
of change, historians tend to view the century in two parts: the 
reign of Peter I (r. 1682-1725), who purportedly spurred Russia 
into modernization, and Catherine II (r. 1762-96), the German 
princess-turned-empress who presided over the culmination of 
Russia’s transformation. Yet, dismissal of nearly forty years of 
Russia’s history does a severe disservice to the sovereigns and 
governments that formed the process of change. Recently, 
Catherine Evtuhov turned her attention to investigating Russia 
under the rule of Elizabeth Petrovna (r. 1741-62), bolstering the 
conversation with a greater perspective of one of these “forgotten 
reigns,” but Elizabeth owed much to her post-Petrine predecessors. 
Specifically, Empress Anna Ivanovna (r. 1730-40) remains one of 
the most overlooked and underappreciated sovereigns of the 
interim between the “Greats.”1 
Anna Ivanovna was born on February 7, 1693, the daughter 
of Praskovia Saltykova and Ivan V Alekseyvich (r. 1682-96), the 
son of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich (r. 1645-1676). When Anna was 
                                                 
1 Anna’s patronymic is also transliterated as Anna Ioannovna. I elected to use 
“Ivanovna” to closer resemble modern Russian. Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the 
Age of Peter the Great (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); 
Catherine Evtuhov’s upcoming book is Russia in the Age of Elizabeth (1741-61). 
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born, her father reigned as co-tsar alongside his half-brother, Peter 
I. When Ivan V died in 1696, Anna and her family passed into the 
care of Peter and his court. Due to her mother’s amicable relations 
with the tsar, so Anna and her sisters lived in comfort. Married to 
Frederick William, the Duke of Courland, part of modern-day 
Latvia, Anna remained regent of the duchy after her husband’s 
death in 1711. Upon the death of Peter II (r. 1727-30), Anna was 
selected as the next empress by the Supreme Privy Council, over 
her other sisters, Catherine and Praskovya, and the two daughters 
of Peter I and Catherine I (r. 1725-27), Anna Petrovna and 
Elizabeth Petrovna.  Returning to Russia in 1730, Anna would 
reign for over ten years, until her death on October 28, 1740.2  
Anna’s reign has long been considered a “dark” one in 
Russian historiography. Described variously as “severe” and 
“comparable to a storm-threatened ship, manned by a pilot and 
crew who are all drunk or asleep. . . with no considerable future,” 
it seems of little doubt that few historians have looked to the 
positive aspects of Anna’s tenure.3 Evgenii Anisimov summed up 
the mainstream opinion on the reign of Anna Ivanovna in his 
introduction to a biography of Elizabeth Petrovna, “With Anna’s 
death a rather dark decade of Russian history (1730-40) receded 
into the past. The collapse of political and social life, mediocre 
leaders, an unproductive foreign policy, an atmosphere of universal 
suspicion and terror—all these had been characteristic of the 
period of Anna’s rule.”4 In the past five years, Russian-speaking 
scholars turned to the middle reigns of the eighteenth century 
looking for themes of continuity from Peter to Catherine II.5 Yet, 
                                                 
2 Philip Longworth, The Three Empresses: Catherine I, Anna and Elizabeth of 
Russia (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 79-81. 
3 Mini Curtiss, A Forgotten Empress: Anna Ivanovna and Her Era (New York: 
Frederick Unga Publishing Company, 1974), 232. 
4 Evgenii V. Anisimov, Empress Elizabeth: Her Reign and Her Russia, 1741-61, 
translated by John T. Alexander (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 
1995), 1.  
5 Igor Fedyukin, “The ‘German’ Reign of Empress Anna: Russia’s Disciplinary 
Moment?” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 19, no. 2 
(Spring 2018): 363-384. 
  
 
despite these advances in Russian scholarship, anglophone scholars 
of Russia heretofore dismissed Anna as a pawn of German 
interests or the “poor relative from Livonia who became 
Empress.”6  
Understanding Russia’s change in the eighteenth century 
means understanding the decade-long tenure of the Empress Anna 
and the ways she mediated the space between past and future. The 
reign of Anna Ivanovna provided substance for the reforms of 
Peter the Great while simultaneously creating the circumstances 
that enabled the successful reigns of the women who followed her 
to the throne, Elizabeth and Catherine II. Anna’s greatest 
contribution in the transitional stages of Russia’s transformation 
was the development of a secular Russian absolutism, concentrated 
in the person of the sovereign, building a sense of unity between 
elements of Russia’s past and its imperial future. If modern 
scholars leave behind their pre-conceived biases against the reign 
of Anna Ivanovna, they will see, as one of her contemporaries 
asserted, “what Peter began, Anna will perfect, adorn, and 
multiply.”7 
 
The Sovereign as First Servant to Master of the State 
 Peter I, through sheer force of will, capitalized on trends 
started under the reign of his father Aleksey Mikhailovich and 
half-sister Sofia Alekseyevna (r. 1682-89, as regent) to transform 
Russia into a European-styled empire. His overhaul of the 
judiciary, military, governmental structure, ecclesiastical and court 
culture of Russia was so successful, it altered the aesthetic fabric of 
Russian society, leading David MacKenzie to conclude that “the 
great ‘Sun King,’ Louis XIV of France” would envy Peter’s 
                                                 
6 Evgenii V. Anisimov, Five Empresses: Court Life in Eighteenth-Century 
Russia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 55. 
 
7 V.K. Trediakovskii, Panegirik…Anne…Ioannovne, (St. Petersburg, 1732), 
quoted in Cynthia Hyla Whittaker, Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century 
Rulers and Writers in Dialogue (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 
2003), 78. 
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successes.8 Despite the possible envy of Louis XIV, Peter I 
nonetheless crafted a scenario in which he and his nobles worked 
in tandem, a partnership. Central to Peter I’s transformation of the 
Russian state was a concept further espoused by Frederick II of 
Prussia (r. 1740-86): “He [the sovereign] is merely the principal 
servant of the State.”9 Peter emulated this throughout his reign, as 
a number of scholars including Mark Raeff, Anisimov, and 
Cynthia Whittaker have assessed.10 Yet, central to Peter I’s policy 
was the inclusion of the nobles in his grand project: his Table of 
Ranks, institution of compulsory service, and installation of the 
nobles in St. Petersburg point to this trend. The evolution of 
Russian autocracy away from a partnership with the nobility began 
with the reign of Anna Ivanovna. She crafted a system of 
government based on the centrality of the autocrat and 
demonstrations of his or her power. She performed this role in 
public ceremonies and in limiting the nobility’s power and 
separating them from the functions of government. To typify this 
shift, Mikhail Lomonosov’s first ode was a congratulations to 
Anna after a victory over the Ottoman Empire in 1739: “Russia, 
how fortunate thou art/Under Anna’s mighty protection,” 
demonstrating the undeniable role of the empress in guiding the 
ship of state.11  
In the ceremonies surrounding the coronation of Anna 
Ivanovna, the philosophical transition of the monarch’s role 
became abundantly clear. This is readily seen in Anna’s Opisanie 
(official descriptions, or albums, of the imperial coronations of 
                                                 
8 David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet 
Union, and Beyond (Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth, 1999), 238.  
9 Frederick II, “Forms of Government and the Duties of Rulers,” (Berlin, 1777), 
3. 
10 Brenda Meehan-Waters, Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service 
Elite of 1730 (New Brunswick, NJ: 1982), 146; Anisimov, Empress Elizabeth, 
144; Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 48-64; Marc Raeff, Understanding Imperial 
Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 45.  
11Mikhail Lomonosov, “Ode to the Sovereign Empress Anna Ioannovna on the 
Victory over the Turks and Tatars, and the Capture of Khotin, in the Year 1739”; 
B.N. Menshutkin, Russia’s Lomonosov (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1952), 34.  
  
 
Russia’s rulers). Richard Wortman observed that the Opisaniia 
“present the coronations as the rulers wished them to be seen.” 
Anna’s Opisanie (1730) was the second such published coronation 
album, the first issued by Peter I in 1723 to commemorate the 
crowning of his wife, Catherine I (r. 1725-27) as empress. 
Wortman, who worked extensively with the albums of the later 
Romanovs, argued that the Russian emperors and empresses were 
greatly influenced by the tradition among the French kings to detail 
their coronations, demonstrating the dress and allegorical symbols 
of the nobility in attendance, as well as the kings themselves.12 
Anna’s album breaks with the tradition set by the French kings and 
her Petrine predecessors by placing herself, as sovereign, at the 
center of the album.13 The inverse of the cover depicts the empress, 
standing alone in full regalia, with the inscription, “Anna—
Empress, and Herself the Ruler of All Russia” (Image 1). 14 
 
The emphasis on Anna and her 
personal power permeates 
throughout the rest of the 
Opisanie. The only rendition of 
a piece of the actual ceremony 
included in the album depicts 
the coronation itself, and Anna 
remains the center of attention. 
As Wortman points out, despite 
the grand scale of the cathedral, 
Anna, “being blessed by the 
archbishop…is the cynosure of 
attention, the center of the 
                                                 
12 Richard Wortman, Visual Texts, Ceremonial Texts, Texts of Exploration: 
Collected Articles on the Representation of Russian Monarchy (Brighton, MA: 
Academic Studies Press, 2014), 3-4. See Le Sacre de Louis XV, roi de France et 
de Navarre dans l’église de Reims (Paris: 1723).  
13 Wortman, Visual Texts, 7-9.  
14 Slavic and East European Collections, The New York Public Library, “Anna 
Imperatritsa i Samoderzhitsa Vserossiiskaia,” New York Public Library Digital 
Collections. This translation is my own. 
Image 1: Front piece of Anna’s coronation album. Slavic and East 
European Collections, The New York Public Library, “Anna 
Imperatritsa i Samoderzhitsa Vserossiiskaia,” New York Public Library 
Digital Collections. 
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Public Library, “Tseremoniia koronovaniia Anny Ioannovny,” The New York 
Public Library Digital Collections. 
 
Subsequent images reinforce this theme: the last vignette depicts a 
fireworks display as Anna personally received ambassadors (Image 
3) and images of the medals worn by Anna and her courtiers show 
engravements of the phrase “za veryu i vernost’,” or, “for faith and 
loyalty,” indicating what all owed the empress (Image 4).16 
                                                 
15 Slavic and East European Collections, The New York Public Library, 
“Tseremoniia koronovaniia Anny Ioannovny,” The New York Public Library 
Digital Collections; Wortman, Visual Texts, 9.  
16 Slavic and East European Collections, The New York Public Library, 
“Izobrazhenie feierverka, goriashchiago v den' koronovaniia Anny Ioannovny,” 
New York Public Library Digital Collections; Slavic and East European 
Collections, The New York Public Library, “Medali,” New York Public Library 




Image 3: Fireworks display at Anna’s coronation. Slavic and East European 
Collections, The New York Public Library, “Izobrazhenie feierverka, 
goriashchiago v den' koronovaniia Anny Ioannovny,” New York Public Library 
Digital Collections. 
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Image 4: Medals worn at Anna’s coronation. Slavic and East European 
Collections, The New York Public Library, “Medali,” New York Public Library 
Digital Collections. 
 
Anna’s Opisanie also represented a break from Petrine 
norms. The first few pages emphasize Anna’s right to rule by 
blood: she was the descendent of Tsar Ivan Alekseyevich, and 
therefore the legitimate empress.17 Peter I abolished the notion of 
                                                 
17 Slavic and East European Collections, NYPL, “Anna Imperatritsa i 
  
 
primogeniture succession in a 1722 Imperial Manifesto, granting 
the reigning emperor the right to name his successor.18 This 
resulted in a number of power struggles around the throne, 
including the one that brought Anna to power.19 Anna’s succession 
manifesto indeed emphasized she ruled “thanks to the general 
desire and agreement of the entire Russian people,” yet she 
reasserted the notion in her Opisanie that her qualification to rule 
was based on hereditary right.20 Anna’s pattern of claiming 
heredity as a right to rule was a measure invoked by her 
successors: Elizabeth Petrovna claimed “close blood ties” to Peter 
I and Catherine I and Paul I officially redacted Peter I’s law of 
succession and re-established primogeniture succession in 1797.21 
In fact, Anna’s coming to the throne and rejection of the 
“Conditions” remained her enduring contribution to Russian 
autocracy and the most indicative marker of the transition from 
servant of the state to its master for the Romanov tsars. Following 
the death of Peter II on January 29, 1730, Anna became the first 
Romanov to be “elected” to the imperial seat. Members of the 
Supreme Privy Council, a nominal advisory board to the sovereign 
which assumed greater power during the reigns of Catherine I and 
Peter II, attempted what Anisimov labeled the establishment of an 
“oligarchic order” and Whittaker “a constitutional monarchy.”22 
Powerful aristocrats, notably Dolgorukii and Golistyn families, 
looked to ensure their continued hold on power at the imperial 
                                                                                                             
Samoderzhitsa Vserossiiskaia.” 
18 Antony Lentin, Peter the Great: The Law on the Imperial Succession; The 
Official Commentary (Oxford: Headstart History, 1996), 27, 33-34, 61-70; 
Russell E. Martin, “Law, Succession, and the Eighteenth-Century Refounding of 
the Romanov Dynasty,” Dubitando: Studies in History and Culture in Honor of 
Donald Ostrowski, ed. by Brian J. Boeck, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel 
Rowland (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2012), 225-42. 
19 Richard Wortman, Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule (Brighton, 
MA: Academic Studies Press, 2013), 41-45.  
20 Oleg Omel’chenko,“Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia 
prestolonaslediia v Rosiiskoi imperii,” 
Femis: Ezhegodnik istorii prava i pravovedeniia, Vyp. 7, 2007, 26-28.  
21 Wortman, Russian Monarchy, 49-50.  
22 Anisimov, Five Empresses, 76; Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 70. 
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court. 23 They selected Anna, whom they believed was sufficiently 
manipulatable, and imposed a series of “Conditions” on her rule. 
The “Conditions,” which Anna acceded to, composed a massive 
limitation on the autocracy in favor of the nobility. Their 
stipulations included taking the power levying of taxes, 
declarations of war and peace, promotion to office, and the 
selection of an heir away from the sovereign. Anna could not even 
marry without their consent. In signing the “Conditions,” Anna, 
still in Courland, accepted the terms that “should I [Anna] not 
carry out or fail to live up to any part of this promise, I shall be 
deprived of the Russian crown” before setting off for Moscow.24 
The “Conditions” represented one of many efforts by a resurgent 
nobility in 1730 to reclaim privileges lost in the wake of the 
Petrine reforms, at the expense of royal absolutism in Russia, 





                                                 
23 Peter II was to marry a Princess Dolgorukaia, but died of smallpox on his 
wedding day. 
24 D. A. Korsokov, Votsarenie Imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny (Kazan, 1880), 8-9.  
25 Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 70. 
Image 5: Anna tears the Conditions before an assembly of nobles. 
“Anna Ioannovna Tears Up Concessions to Privy Council,” in 
I.N.Bozherianov, “Nevskii prospekt,” Kul’turno-istoricheskii 





Anna’s rejection, rather than accession, to the “Conditions” 
became her lasting legacy to the formation of Russian autocracy. If 
the newly-styled “electors” of the Supreme Privy Council believed 
that Anna was docile and easily-dominated, they severely 
underestimated her. The nobility, in fact, drew rather sexist 
conclusions about Anna’s ability to rule: one group of 288 
Muscovite nobles calling themselves the “Cherkasskii group” 
proposed a regency because they believed since Anna was “a 
female person” and “her knowledge of the laws is inadequate,” the 
male nobility should take an active role in government “until the 
Almighty gives us a male person on the throne.”26 Upon arriving in 
Moscow from Mitau, Courland on February 15, 1730, Anna found 
a city teeming with nobles from throughout the empire, gathered 
for Peter II’s wedding, then funeral, disgruntled with the 
Dolgorukii and Golistyn families. Capitalizing on this, Anna began 
a propaganda and letter-writing campaign to the wives of powerful 
magnates, building her support among the nobility excluded from 
the deliberations of the Supreme Privy Council.27  
What resulted became what Whittaker dubbed the 
“February Days” and Valerie Kivelson and Ronald Suny “the 
Constitutional Crisis of 1730” in which over 400 noblemen from 
the Supreme Privy Council, other branches of the nobility, and 
Anna and her supporters, grappled for dominance in Moscow.28 To 
break the impasse, Anna reneged on her previous acceptance of the 
“Conditions” and directly defied them by mobilizing the regiments 
of Imperial Guards around Moscow as the “new legitimate 
sovereign of Russia.”29 Faced with mounting pressure from 
                                                 
26 Vasilii Tatishchev, “Discourse,” in Paul Dukes, Russia Under Catherine the 
Great, vol. 1, Select Documents on Government and Society (Newtonville, MA: 
1978), 25-27. Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 72-3.  
27 Lavender Cassels, The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740 (London: 
Murray, 1966), 31. 
28 Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 75-7; Valerie A. Kivelson and Ronald Grigor 
Suny, Russia’s Empires (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 101.  
29 Korsokov, Votsarenie, 17-18; Vera Proskurina, Politics and Poetry in the Age 
of Catherine II (Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2011), 15. Peter the 
Great established the regiments of guards in 1692 after a failed revolution by the 
streltsy, and elite unit of musketeers entrusted with the security of the tsars from 
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factions of the aristocracy and the threat of the guards, the 
Supreme Privy Council capitulated. Rejecting varied petitions from 
the assembled nobles, Anna refused to compromise the principle of 
her autocratic rule. Finally, on the afternoon of February 25, 1730, 
262 aristocrats signed a petition to “Most illustrious, Most 
powerful, Great Sovereign Empress Anna Ioannovna, Autocrat of 
All Russia,” in which they beseeched her “to accept autocracy just 
as Your glorious and worthy ancestors did and to annul the 
Conditions sent to Your Imperial Majesty from the Supreme 
Council and signed by Your Majesty’s hand.”30 Anna accepted this 
petition, ordered the “Conditions” brought to her, and “in plain 
view of everyone present took [them] and tore [them] in two” 
(Image 5).31 
 The act of tearing the “Conditions” deserves further 
exploration, though historians often dismiss it as theatrics.32 Anna, 
like her predecessors, realized the necessity to perform power that 
lay at the heart of autocratic rule. Her decision to tear up the 
“Conditions” was wrapped in layers of legal and monarchial 
symbolism. One ode captured the exact moment of the tearing: 
В сей день Августа наша свергла долг свой ложный, 
Растерзавши на себе хирограф подложный 
И выняла скипетр свой от гражданского ада 
И тем стала Россия весела и рада 
Таково смотрение продолжи нам, боже 
Да державе Российской не вредит ничто же 
А ты, всяк, кто не мыслит вводить строй отманный 
Бойся самодержавной прелестниче Анны 
Как оная бумажка, все твои подлоги 
                                                                                                             
the time of Ivan the Terrible (r. 1533-84). The guards played a crucial role in 
palace revolutions from the death of Peter I in 1725 until the accession of 
Alexander I (r. 1801-25) in 1801. For more, see James Cracraft, The Petrine 
Revolution in Russian Culture (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2004).  
30 Korsokov, Votsarenie, 274-7. 
31 Korsokov, Votsarenie, 274. The torn sheet now resides in The Russian State 
Archives of Ancient Documents (RGADA). 
32 Anisimov, Five Empresses, 81; Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 77.  
  
 
Растерзанные падут под царские ноги. 
 
 
On that same day, our Augustus overthrew her false debt 
Savaging (tearing) the forgery of a chirograph 
Pulled her scepter (reign) out of the civic hell 
And so Russia became filled with joy 
May God continue to watch over us 
Yes, Russian power threatens nothing 
And you who wish to limit that power 
Fear the autocratic charm of Anna 
Like this piece of paper, all of your frauds 
Torn to pieces, fall beneath the feet of the Tsar.33  
 
From this poetic description, two important images emerge: one, 
the autocratic power inherent in the physical act of tearing, and 
second, the association of the “Conditions” with a chirograph 
(khirograf). Chirographs, or indentures, were a type of legal 
contract popular in eleventh through seventeenth-century Europe, 
in which a contract was drawn up in two versions, on the same 
sheet of parchment. The word cirographum, a variant, or a picture 
of Jesus, was written between the two versions and a judge would 
cut or tear the sheet in half through this word. In theory, the 
agreement could be proven or ratified by the process of fitting 
together the two sheets. For chirographs, the contract became 
legally binding when it was torn or cut, creating a loud noise which 
symbolized the forming of the pact. 34 Additionally, the idea of 
                                                 
33 Fyodor Prokopovich, “Lines Concerning 25 February,” quoted in Sergei M. 
Soloviev, Istoria Rossii s drevneishikh vremen (Moscow: Social-Economic 
Litersture, 1963), XIX, 3. Translation is my own.  
34 Brigitte Bedos-Rezak, “Cutting Edge: The Economy of Mediality in Twelfth-
Century Chirographic Writing,” in Das Mittelalter 15 (2010): 134-161; Kathryn 
A. Lowe, “Lay Literacy in Anglo-Saxon England: The Development of the 
Chirograph,” in P. Pulsiano and E. Treharne, eds., Anglo Saxon Manuscripts and 
their Heritage (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 161–204. See also, H.E. Salter, 
Facsimiles of Early Charters in Oxford Muniment Rooms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1929). 
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contract invoked images of the Russian past, notably the contracts 
between the Rurik princes of Novgorod entering into contract with 
the people of the city, limiting the power of the princes.35  
Anna’s tearing of the “Conditions” gestured to this 
tradition. The tearing ceremony itself was indeed theatrical, but 
symbolic of the tangible power Anna claimed for herself. One, 
Anna summoned the nobles before her and ordered the 
“Conditions” brought to her, demonstrating her ability to be 
obeyed. Secondly, the tearing of the document itself would have 
been a jarring experience: when the parchment tore, the sound 
itself would be loud enough to startle those in the room. Finally, in 
ripping a contract she affixed her name to, Anna showed that she 
was symbolically above the law of contracts—her power 
transcended the agreement, hence her ability to tear it asunder—
and rejected the historical precedent of the Novgorod princes. In 
drawing on the tradition of the chirograph, Anna channeled the 
idea of the making of the contract: her contract to rule 
autocratically without limits became legally binding when she 
destroyed the contract which represented an attempt to impose 
control over her. Anna performed her power in ripping the 
“Conditions” in half, showing herself to be above tradition and 
contract, presenting her determination to rule, rather than be ruled 
(Image 6).  
 
                                                 
35 Simon Franklin, Writing, Society, and Culture in Early Rus’, c. 950-1300 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 175-76.  
  
 
               
Image 6: The torn Conditions of Anna Ivanovna, note the tear through the 
middle of the document.  “Conditions of Anna Ivanovna,” double sheet, pisarsky 
handwriting, torn from top to bottom obliquely, 32.0 x 20cm, Russian State 
Archive of Ancient Acts. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 12a-12b. Digitized by the Russian 
Military Historical Society.  
 
Anna’s rejection of oligarchical constitutionalism 
transformed how Russians saw their monarchy yet retained the 
centrality of autocracy.36 As Wortman asserted, “the compact 
between throne and nobility was sealed” by Anna’s actions in 
1730, reversing trends of aristocratic reassertion in the reigns 
following the death of Peter I.37 The monarchy, even more than in 
the reign of Peter I, bore the central role as progenitor of the state’s 
power. Fyodor Prokopovich sermonized the national mood in his 
sermon “Slovo v den’ vospominaniia koronatsii Imp. Anny 
Ioannovny” (“A word on remembering the day of the coronation of 
Empress Anna Ivanovna”), in which he concluded “all…benefits 
                                                 
36 Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 77. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, The Image of 
Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 25.  
37 Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian 
Monarchy, Vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 82. 
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and gains come to us through our autocrats.”38 Anna’s early reign 
was marked by a reassertion of the power of the central monarchy. 
Symbolically, Anna shifted the capital back to St. Petersburg from 
Moscow, returning the seat of power to the city Peter I built to 
typify his imperial projects, and invested large amounts of state 
funds in remodeling the city in the Baroque style.39 Anna made this 
an entirely public affair, instituted by her government, even seizing 
funds from the Church and private agencies to have her 
government undertake the originally planned project.40 Anna 
indeed “conceived ways to bring new benefits to the fatherland,” 
as Prokopovich charged.41  
Anna’s reign aimed to weaken the power of the aristocracy 
at court. Bearing in mind the role of the nobility in the attempted 
constitutionalist coup d’état of 1730, Anna abolished the Supreme 
Privy Council and re-established the Senate and cabinet system of 
her uncle.42 To further weaken the aristocracy, Anna and her 
ministers purged the guards regiments of the sons of the 
aristocracy; Anna’s trimming was so successful that Anisimov 
declared that by the time of Elizabeth Petrovna’s coup d’état, only 
around twenty percent of the guardsmen were of noble birth.43 
Anna’s government provided substantial support to the Academy 
                                                 
38 F. Prokopovich, “Slovo v den’ vospominaniia koronatsii Imp. Anny 
Ioannovny (28 April 1734),” Slova i rechi (St. Petersburg, 1765), 78-81, cited in 
Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 77. Translation is my own.  
39 S. V. Sementsov, “From Catherine the First to Anna Ioannovna. 1724-1732: 
The Time of Doubts and Uncertainty in the Destiny of the Capital City -- Should 
It Be Allowed to Remain a Town-Planning Heritage of Peter the Great?” Vestnik 
Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Seriia 7: Geologia, Geografia, no. 4 
(December 2013), 119-25.  
40 N. V. Pivovarova, “The Intricacies of the Church Life in St Petersburg Time of 
Empress Anna Ioannovna. The History of the Construction of the Church of the 
Nativity of the Mother of God.” Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 
Iskusstvovedenie 6, no. 2 (June 2016), 76-77.  
41 F. Prokopovich, “Slovo v den’ Koronatsii Anny Ioannovny (28 April 1731),” 
Slova i rechi, 78-81, quoted in Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 77.  
42 Alexander Lipski, “A Re-Examination of the ‘Dark Era’ of Anna Ioannovna,” 
The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Dec. 1956), 
483-85. 
43 Anisimov, Empress Elizabeth, 24-6; Anisimov, Five Empresses, 174-75.  
  
 
of Sciences and encouraged foreign trade and local manufactory 
(Aleksandr Kamenskii argued that “by 1740 Russia produced more 
cast iron than any other country in the world”), all to strengthen the 
prestige and monetary power of the sovereign.44  
To further limit the influence of Russia’s nobility, Anna’s 
government increasingly involved itself in their private lives. 
Several “condemnations” of Anna’s reign stem from this attempt. 
Anna’s reign became known for its “police-state cruelty,” her 
penchant for “matchmaking,” and also for lessening the obligations 
of the nobles to the state instituted by Peter I.45 Yet, each supported 
an attempt by the throne to centralize its own authority. In 
arranging marriages, Anna demonstrated her power over the 
persons of her court, the most famous example being the 
“Wedding in the Ice Palace” in which Anna married her court 
jester to a Kalmyk woman inside a house fashioned from large 
blocks of ice, where courtiers were forced to remain, under guard, 
throughout the wedding night.46 This was carnivalesque spectacle 
in the extreme, yet demonstrated the power of the autocrat over the 
very persons of her subjects, and nature itself. Anna’s government 
actively pursued intrigue and plots against the throne, giving her 
reign the epitaph of “police state,” yet these executions only served 
to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the autocrat. Finally, in 
allowing noble families to retain one son on their estates instead of 
enforcing the requirements set by Peter I, Anna split the attention 
of aristocratic families between their estates and the court.47 All of 
these acts pointed to the symbolic and tangible power of the 
sovereign, centralizing the government of Russia in a single entity: 
Anna Ivanovna.  
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Anna created the pageantry of Russian monarchy, 
emphasizing its role as union with the sovereign at its head. 
Russian scholars in the past two decades explored at length the 
ways in which Anna’s predecessors, Peter I and Catherine I, 
strengthened absolutist authority by invoking religious symbols. 
Ernest Zitzer, in his The Transfigured Kingdom: Sacred Parody 
and Charismatic Authority at the Court of Peter the Great, argued 
that through the institution of the “Unholy Synod,” Peter inverted 
the roles of Christ and prince, making himself the religious and 
charismatic head of the state with religious undertones.48 The 
symbolism continued with the accession of his wife, Catherine I, 
whose government, Gary Marker argued, consciously invoked the 
image of St. Catherine of Alexandria in relation to the sovereign, 
espousing a religious origin of female rule to ensure loyalty among 
Russia’s ecclesiastical hierarchy.49 Anna’s reign, by contrast, saw 
the imposition of a secular scenario of unity. There was a “union” 
between the autocrat and her ancestors, while simultaneously a 
union between the autocrat and the people grounded in the body of 
the sovereign herself, as her accession manifesto decreed: “And 
since all our loyal subjects unanimously asked that We deign to 
accept Autocracy for Our Russian Empire, as had our forefathers 
from the earliest times, We have so deigned.”50 Another union 
existed between a Russian past and future: Anna was, after all, 
selected because of her descent from Ivan Alekseyevich and 
association with a pre-Petrine past, yet pushed Russia farther down 
the road Peter I began.51 As one scholar asserted: “It was as if 
different eras came together in Empress Anna’s court: the 
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Muscovite seventeenth century met the coarse manners of the new 
Russian capital city and the European eighteenth century.”52 
Anna’s reign was built on the secularized pageantry of unity, 
situated in the person of the sovereign empress around whom the 
court revolved. 
 
Charting the Course of Russian Absolutism 
Anna’s succession battle achieved much more than the 
preservation of Russian autocracy in the style of her “worthy 
ancestors:” it provided a performance model for female rulers to 
seize the throne of Russia. Vera Proskurina notes how Anna 
mobilized the guards regiments by declaring herself their colonel 
and “performed several ritual acts of cross-dressing,” donning the 
uniform of a guard to greet the regiments and awarding herself the 
Order of Saint Apostle Andrew the First Called (marked by a blue 
ribbon). Proskurina points out that the Order of Saint Andrew was 
“conferred only upon the highest-ranking male officials of the 
state” and had a female equivalent, the Order of Saint Catherine 
the Martyr of God, which Peter I created for his wife, Catherine 
I.53 Anna, however, purposefully chose the masculine medal, 
reinforcing an idea of gender-bending in the person of the 
sovereign.  
By actively choosing to assume a masculine persona in her 
coup d’état, Anna set a precedent for the women who would rule 
after her, namely Elizabeth Petrovna and Catherine II. When 
Elizabeth seized the throne on November 25, 1741, she donned a 
guardsman’s uniform and cuirass to lead a troop of the 
Preobrazhenskii regiment with a Saint Andrew ribbon pinned on 
her chest.54 Catherine II emulated both Anna and Elizabeth when 
she deposed her husband, Peter III (r. 1762), in 1762.55 “Catherine 
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II on horseback,” a portrait commissioned by Catherine after her 
coup d’état, depicts the empress in full uniform with the Order of 
Saint Andrew draped across her (Image 7).  
 
Image 7: Catherine II in uniform, leading guardsmen during her coup d’état. 
Vigilius Ericksen, “Catherine II of Russia in Life Guard Uniform on the Horse 
Brillante,” 1771, oil on canvas, 358x388cm, Copenhagen, Denmark, Statens 
Museum for Kunst. 
 
The example set by of Anna Ivanovna created a scenario of female 
rule and inspired the women who followed her to incorporate 
elements of her performance.  
                                                                                                             
Civilization (London: Routledge Harwood Academic Publishers, 2001), 33-54.  
  
 
 Anna provided the example not only of a means for a 
woman to seize power, but also a way to exercise it. The most 
enduring attack on the reign of Anna was the epithet attached to it: 
Bironovshchina, or, “Age of Biron.” This title derives from the 
close affair between Anna and Ernst Johann Biron, Duke of 
Courland and Semigalia. Anisimov asserts that the title 
Bironovshchina stems from the idea that Biron was “the actual 
ruler” and came to be “associated closely with the hegemony of 
foreign favorites and a system of ferocious political terror.”56 
Contemporaries of Anna certainly appeared to ascribe to this 
worldview. A song with the following verse became quite popular 
and circulated around Petersburg: 
The tsar no longer rules us 
And it is not a Russian Prince who issues orders, 
Instead, it is an evil tyrant from Germania 
Who commands, who amuses himself.57 
 
In another instance, a series of water-colored pornographic prints 
circulated in the 1790s and now housed in the New York Public 
Library depict Anna and Biron in flagrante delicto with the 
accompanying verse: 
Сей знатной господин 
Большой имеет чин 
Заслугою своей 
Гордился перед нами 
Бирон сей господин  
И он вот перед вами 
Внук конюха 
И сам барейтор  
Он дурой Анною 
В конец был возлюблен  
Ебая Анну Россию 
Еб во всю  
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Но после восприял  
Кару за то всию 
 
This distinguished gentleman  
holds a lofty rank.  
He prided himself on his merits over us.  
This gentleman's name is Biron  
and here he is in front of you.  
Although he was the grandson of a groom,  
and had himself served as Bareiter, 
in the end he became the paramour of that fool Anna.  
Screwing Anna,  
he really fucked Russia over.  
However, he did get his come-uppance for it all in the end.58  
 
The condemnation of Anna’s rule as one of rule by 
“foreigners” found its roots in deep xenophobia and Russian 
patriotism. Popular anecdotes about Ivan Balakriev, the former 
jester for Peter I, often juxtaposed the wit of the “true” Russian 
jester against the ignorance of Germans.59 As Sergei Solviev 
asserted, favorites were never the problem, as Peter I and Catherine 
I kept them, but that those “were ours, they were Russians,” as 
opposed to the German clique of Anna.60 This idea of retaking the 
Russian land from the hands of foreigners was promoted by the 
government of Elizabeth Petrovna after she ascended the throne. 
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Indeed, Elizabeth Petrovna’s accession in 1741 was heralded by 
over one hundred sermons across the empire which extoled the 
return of the native to the throne of Russia, the recapture of 
“Peter’s heritage from the hands of foreigners.”61 While Germans 
like Biron did dominate Anna’s government, it was not entirely to 
the detriment of the empire. In a recent article in the Slavic Review, 
Igor Fedyukin argued that the “German” reign of Anna advanced 
the Petrine mode of reform from above because her ministers 
incorporated elements of Prussian state-building and centralization 
to the Russian administration.62 While certainly the target of 
patriotic fervor, Anna’s reliance on Biron and other Germans was 
not merely a means of bolstering westernization, it also provided 
another mechanism of Russian autocratic rule: the favorite.  
 Each of the empresses of Russia, Catherine I, Anna, 
Elizabeth, and Catherine II, as well as the regent Anna 
Leopoldovna, earned the ire of contemporaries and modern 
scholars for keeping lovers at court. The Russian word for these 
men was “фаворит,” which most directly translates as “favorite.” 
Academic readings of the favorites divide them into two distinct 
camps: one that sees the them as proof of the innate licentiousness 
of the Russian empresses, especially Catherine II, or merely an 
expression of the Russian desire to be “ruled by a man.”63 
However, the relationships between the favorites and the 
empresses should not be so misogynistically read, nor 
misconstrued as having to be purely platonic or entirely romantic. 
For instance, Anna almost certainly loved Biron, yet she had no 
intentions of granting him autocratic power. Rather, the favorites 
became a functioning member of the apparatus of government: 
they held prominent ministerial positions while in favor and the 
empresses used them as a means to screen and filter personal 
requests to the sovereign. They received stipends and access at 
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court but held very little tangible authority.64 The office of favorite 
was a means of ensuring loyalty from competent administrators, 
not unlike the maîtresse-en-titre of the French court at Versailles. 
Much like her accession blueprint, Anna bequeathed the effective 
performance of favorite/benefactress to her successors. Both 
Elizabeth and Catherine II would take long-term partners as Anna 
did with Biron and weave them into the apparatus of government.65 
 
Conclusions: Change as Navigation, Anna as Navigator 
Far from the period of stagnation detractors accused it of, 
the reign of Anna Ivanovna represented a volatile series of 
performances which strengthened Russian absolutism.66 Her re-
orientation of the principles of autocracy, symbolized by her 
tearing of the “Conditions,” re-affirmed the role of the monarch as 
the holder of true power in the Russian Empire. Subsequent 
performances, seen in her coronation album and public displays, 
re-iterated the unquestionable authority of not only the institution 
of monarchy, but the monarch herself. Anna reasserted herself at 
the heart of the web of rule: power disseminated out from the 
center, with the government spearheading the renovation of the 
capital and personally intervening in the lives of courtiers. In a 
way, more than her uncle Peter I, Anna brought the power of the 
Russian monarchy over the nobility to a level equitable with that of 
the court at Versailles. Anna, not Peter, would have been the envy 
of the Sun King.   
In the reign of Anna, the intricacies of the processes of 
change become evident. Anna inherited a mixed legacy of rule and 
power from Peter I and his immediate successors. A resentful and 
powerful nobility, no longer content with cooperation in the 
transformation of the state, manipulated the autocracy in an 
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attempt to reassert their own desires. Some dreamed of a return to 
the zemskii sobor which elected Mikhail Romanov tsar in 1613, 
some desired a greater say in governmental policy, others wanted 
nothing more than a release from service and a return to their 
estates.67 Nonetheless, Anna found a means to unify the nobility in 
the image of the monarchy. The sovereign became the bridge 
between the pre and post-Petrine Russia, the “people” and the 
state, and the dynasty at large. By promoting the institution of the 
emperor/empress as the unifying dogma of the state, Anna 
continued the work of Peter I and translated his grand schemes of 
reform into a tangible path that found its fruition under her 
successors. 
Wortman’s classic study, Scenarios of Power: Myth and 
Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, demonstrated the mechanics of 
performance utilized by the Romanovs to demonstrate their ethos 
of power, but glossed over the particular modes of collective 
female power in the eighteenth century: women rule in Russia was 
not an “accident of genetics,” but a concentrated scenario of its 
own.68 From 1725-96, Russia experienced less than four years of 
direct male rule because a subsequent line of empresses utilized 
existing systems of absolutism. Central to this development was 
the reign of Anna Ivanovna, for she set the tone for decades of 
female rule in Russia. By tying rulership more tightly to the person 
of the sovereign (a figure able to bend the lines of gender 
normativity when needed), secularizing notions of charismatic 
rule, trimming the nobility out of the apparatus of power, re-
emphasizing dynastic heritage, and creating an organ of 
government in the person of the favorite, Anna set the stage for 
Elizabeth Petrovna and Catherine II, who emulated her 
performances as they themselves came to and maintained power. 
Anna became the progenitor of a new style of Russian monarchy, 
performing a scenario that became literary canon over subsequent 
acts of Romanov rule in Russia. 
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